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ABSTRACT
This Comment examines the recently rejected motion to dismiss in League of
Conservation Voters v. Trump and its potential to serve as a roadmap for
environmental organizations seeking to challenge regulatory rollbacks by the
Trump administration. In 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive
order reversing the designation of 128 million acres of ocean as protected from
oil and gas leasing. The League of Conservation Voters, along with other
environmental activists, sued to enjoin the rollback, and administration
officials subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. This Comment focuses on the
issue of Article III standing in the case, wherein the plaintiffs must allege (1)
an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and (3)
that a favorable judicial decision will likely redress. Prior to League of
Conservation Voters, case law had not established injury in fact on the basis of
potential harm to public lands caused by government deregulation. Thus, the
ruling that such an injury can be established—even over an area 128 million
acres in size—reflects an opportunity for environmental activists attempting
to stop rollbacks.

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the election of President Donald Trump, environmental
organizations have often found themselves at odds with environmental
regulators. In 2015 and 2016, using his authority under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA), President Barack Obama
withdrew 128 million acres of coastal parts of the Arctic and Atlantic
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Oceans from oil and gas leasing.1 Shortly after his inauguration, President
Trump issued Executive Order 13795, reversing President Obama’s prior
withdrawals.2 One week later, on May 3, 2017, a group of environmental
organizations, including the League of Conservation Voters, Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Sierra Club, and The Wilderness
Society, among others, jointly filed suit in the U.S. District Court in
Alaska, alleging before Judge Sharon Gleason that OCSLA does not give
the President authority to reverse prior withdrawals.3
The federal defendants and the intervenors filed motions to dismiss
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the basis
of (1) sovereign immunity, (2) the lack of a private right of action, (3) the
court’s inability to issue declaratory relief against the President, and (4)
the lack of Article III standing.4 In League of Conservation Voters v. Trump,
the district court dismissed each alleged basis for the defendants’ motion
to dismiss,5 thereby permitting the litigation to proceed.
League of Conservation Voters creates a potential blueprint for
environmental and other organizations to follow as they seek to take their
fights against administration policies to the courtroom. The case is
significant for its analysis of Article III standing—particularly for
showing that litigants suing to protect public lands can satisfy the
standing requirement for injury in fact—though the additional three
hurdles the plaintiffs overcame are also important. This Comment will
first go through the statutory and case history surrounding the
withdrawal of federal lands from oil and gas leasing, followed by a closer
look at the district court’s ruling in the case. Subsequently, it will analyze
the issue of standing in particular, as well as the broader applicability of
this approach for environmental organizations challenging regulatory
rollbacks. This Comment will establish that League of Conservation Voters
acts as a green light for such organizations to move their conflicts with
the present administration to the courts.

II. REVERSING FEDERAL LANDS PROTECTIONS AND CHALLENGES
BY ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
OCSLA gives the Secretary of the Interior responsibility for the
mineral exploration and development of the Outer Continental Shelf

1. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d. 985, 990 (D.
Alaska 2018).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 991.
4. Id. at 992–93.
5. Id. at 1004.
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(OCS).6 Under OCSLA, the President “may, from time to time, withdraw
from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental
Shelf.”7 OCSLA has been amended several times since 1953; however,
none of these changes have altered the ultimate mechanisms by which
land is withdrawn from exploration.8 The statute does not have an explicit
mechanism for the President to rescind a withdrawal, and no previous
President has ever attempted a withdrawal.9 This presents two major
questions with President Trump’s Executive Order: first, whether a
subsequent President may rescind a Section 12(a) withdrawal; second,
who has standing to challenge a rollback.10 The present order only
answers the second question.
In order to establish standing, plaintiffs must sufficiently allege (1)
an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and
(3) that a favorable judicial decision will likely redress.11 To prove an
injury in fact, plaintiffs must show the harm is imminent, geographically
specific, and particularized.12 Courts have effectively recognized that
injury in fact can be established even where the harm is contingent upon
a series of future actions by third parties.13 However, prior to League of
Conservation Voters, case law had not established injury in fact on the basis
of potential harm to public lands caused by government deregulation.
While it is not novel for plaintiffs to be able to suggest a particularized
injury, rather than just general harm, as a result of deregulation,14 the case

6. 43 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). Under OCSLA, the outer continental shelf
contains all submerged lands within three miles of shore that fall under U.S.
jurisdiction. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., OCS Lands Act History,
https://www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ (last accessed Jan. 30, 2019).
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018).
8. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., supra note 6.
9. Carol J. Miller, For a Lump of Coal & a Drop of Oil: An Environmentalist’s
Critique of the Trump Administration’s First-Year Policies, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 185, 212–
13 (2018).
10. Robert T. Anderson, Protecting Offshore Drilling Areas from Oil and Gas
Leasing: Presidential Authority under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and
Antiquities Act, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 727, 763–64. Anderson goes on to argue that
because the Section 12(a) revocation was issued “without expiration,” it is up to
Congress alone to provide otherwise. Id. at 764.
11. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d. 985, 995–96 (D.
Alaska 2018).
12. Id.
13. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000 (1982) (finding established injury
in fact despite reliance on uncertain future third-party acts).
14. In Alaska Wildlife All. v. Jensen, the Ninth Circuit held that there is
sufficient particular harm for standing when “noise, trash, and wakes of vessels”
diminish plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the land. 108 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 1997).
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ventures into new territory with respect to the geographic scope of the
claimed injury—covering 128 million acres of ocean.15
The ruling in League of Conservation Voters has already served as a
guide elsewhere in the world of environmental litigation. The NRDC
relied on it as a basis for establishing injury in fact in its brief opposing
the government’s motion to dismiss in Hopi Tribe v. Trump,16 a suit
challenging the Trump administration’s decision to make 1.15 million
acres of Bears Ears National Monument available to mining interests.17
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump also offers implications for standing
in cases like a suit brought by Our Children’s Trust, filed on behalf of a
group of children challenging government inaction in combatting climate
change.18 The ongoing litigation offers further opportunity to flesh out
what these challenges to litigation may look like—as long as they can get
over initial hurdles to dismiss.

III. THE LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS BRINGS SUIT
On April 28, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13795,
rescinding the previous withdrawal of 128 million acres of the continental
shelf from offshore exploration.19 The next day, the Secretary of the
Interior issued an order, which called in part for the expedited
consideration of seismic permitting applications.20 These applications
permitted the use of loud sound pulses to identify potential oil and gas
deposits—pulses which several environmental organizations, including
the League of Conservation Voters, claimed would harm and potentially
kill various fish and marine mammals.21 The environmental activists
brought suit on May 3, 2017, alleging that the action both exceeded the
President’s Article II powers22 and was ultra vires as OCSLA does not

15. Plaintiffs, in their brief opposing the motion to dismiss, cited Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 899 (1990), which offered a similar claim to protect a
large tract of federal land, but even then it was on a much smaller scale, in the
thousands of acres.
16. NRDC Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at
4, Hopi Tribe v. Trump (D.D.C. 2018) (Nos. 17-cv-2590 (TSC), 17-cv-2605 (TSC),
17-cv-2606 (TSC)), 2018 WL 6112218.
17. Id.
18. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018).
19. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985, 990 (D.
Alaska 2018).
20. Id. at 991.
21. Id.
22. Id. The complaint alleges that the action intrudes upon Congress’s nondelegated exclusive power under the Property Clause in violation of the
separation of powers. Id.
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authorize the President to reverse a prior withdrawal.23 The suit named
President Trump, then-Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke, and Secretary
of Commerce Wilbur Ross as defendants, with the American Petroleum
Institute and State of Alaska permitted to join as intervenors.24
In the present opinion, the district court considered dismissal on the
basis of (1) sovereign immunity, (2) the lack of a private right of action,
(3) the inability of the court to issue declaratory relief against the
President, and (4) a lack of Article III standing.25
The court quickly dispensed with the first three arguments.26 With
respect to sovereign immunity, the court noted the present case fits neatly
into the exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine where an officer
makes an allegedly unconstitutional act in the sovereign’s name.27 It
explained that a statutory grant of a private right of action is unnecessary
because the plaintiffs are not suing to enforce federal law, but rather to
challenge the President for allegedly exceeding his constitutional
authority.28 The court largely sidestepped the issue of declaratory
judgment, noting that, should the plaintiffs win, an injunction against
subordinate officials should be sufficient, thereby obviating the problems
with issuing a declaratory judgment against the President.29
The court spent more time on Article III standing, which requires the
plaintiffs to allege (1) an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct and (3) that a favorable judicial decision will likely
redress.30 To prove an injury in fact, plaintiffs must show the harm is
imminent, geographically specific, and particularized.31 For the purposes
of a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficient standing, as seen here,
the issue is simply whether the general facts alleged are enough to
support the claim, not whether the harm itself has actually occurred.32 The
23. Id.
24. Id. Zinke was named because the U.S. Department of the Interior
administers OCSLA, while the U.S. Department of Commerce implements the
Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act. Id.
25. Id. at 993. These were based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
arguing that the complaint is facially insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction and
placing an affirmative burden on the plaintiffs to establish Article III standing.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiffs must also be able to show a claim to relief
that is facially plausible, with more than the “sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
26. 303 F. Supp. 3d at 993–95.
27. Id. at 993. This is one of two exceptions the Court has laid out, in addition
to when an officer acts beyond the scope of his statutorily limited powers. Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–91 (1994).
28. 303 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
29. Id. at 995.
30. Id. at 995–96.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs could demonstrate injury in
fact and so possessed Article III standing.33
First, the district court held that the plaintiffs could show sufficiently
imminent harm.34 The primary barrier to standing for a group like the
present plaintiffs—suing to protect lands over which they have no claim
of ownership—is that their actual harm is too causally attenuated to
establish injury in fact.35 Here, the district court found that the harm
mirrored that of In re Zappos.com, Inc.36 In that case, the Ninth Circuit
found standing because though harm had not yet occurred, the risk of
harm did not depend on a chain of speculative inferences; rather, the risk
was imminent because the hackers who stole the data had the ability to
harmfully misuse it.37 From this, the district court concluded that the
League of Conservation Voters plaintiffs had established sufficiently
imminent harm through allegations that the Executive Order expedited
energy production and that drilling had already begun in the previously
withdrawn areas.38
Next, in determining whether the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient
“geographic specificity,” the court focused on Center for Biological
Diversity v. Kempthorne.39 In Kempthorne, the Ninth Circuit held that “the
degree of geographic specificity required depends on the size of the area
that is impacted by the government’s action.”40 Notably, the Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiff’s identification of the region as “the Beaufort Sea
region” was sufficient.41 Here, despite covering 128 million acres of ocean,
the district court also found that the injury was sufficiently
geographically specific.42 The court explained that because the area in
question is discrete and defined, the size of it does not ultimately present
an issue.43 It concluded that this was sufficient when coupled with the
plaintiffs’ statements that they visit and use the Atlantic Ocean and
adjacent areas.44
This left the court with the question of particularized harm. In order
to satisfy this requirement, plaintiffs must show the injury affects them in
33. Id. at 1001.
34. Id. at 999.
35. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013) (finding
insufficient standing for U.S. citizens to challenge the Foreign Intelligence Services
Act because it required a “multi-link chain of inferences”).
36. 303 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 997–98.
39. 303 F. Supp. 3d. at 1000 (citing 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009)).
40. 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009).
41. Id. at 707–08.
42. League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d. at 1000.
43. Id.
44. Id.

36.1 BUCHTA-JORGENSEN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

5/20/2019 1:58 PM

LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS

115

a personalized, individual way—the injury must actually be to the
individual, not just the environment.45 The court determined that this
threshold was also met, on the ground that the drilling would allegedly
cause the animals pain and suffering, which would interfere with the
plaintiffs’ “use and enjoyment of the areas and associated wildlife.”46
Taken collectively, the district court rejected the notion that the
plaintiffs had failed to meet the requirements for Article III standing and
the motions to dismiss were denied.47
Having overcome the motions to dismiss, the litigation remains
ongoing and it is being followed closely by environmental activists.48
Although the present ruling did not garner much attention outside these
circles, the case as a whole will ultimately be of vital interest both inside
and outside of the administration.

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING ESTABLISHED STANDING
On March 29, 2019, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
holding that the executive order exceeded the president’s authority.49 The
administration is widely expected to appeal the decision to the Ninth
Circuit.50 Although the underlying suit in League of Conservation Voters has
not yet been resolved and the full implications of the present ruling are as
yet unclear, this decision may show other regulation challengers how to
survive the crucial test of establishing injury in fact for Article III
standing. In effect, it could provide a structural framework for
environmental groups to generate suits challenging regulatory rollbacks.
While it did not alter the test, it does show private parties how to satisfy
the requirements that the injury be (1) sufficiently imminent, (2)
geographically specific, and (3) particularized.51
To survive a motion to dismiss where standing is challenged, the
party bringing the suit bears the burden of proof, as he would for any
other essential element of his claims, including the three requirements for
injury in fact.52 General factual allegations of injury resulting from the

45. Id.
46. Id. at 1001.
47. Id. at 1001, 1004.
48. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9; Anderson, supra note 10.
49. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG, 2019 WL
1431217 at *13 (D. Alaska Mar. 29, 2019).
50. Kevin Bohn, Judge rules Trump executive order allowing offshore drilling in
Arctic Ocean unlawful, CNN (Mar. 30, 2019, 7:16 PM), available at
www.cnn.com/2019/03/30/politics/trump-offshore-drilling-arctic/index.html.
51. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d. 985, 1004 (D.
Alaska 2018).
52. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
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defendant’s conduct will suffice on a motion to dismiss because the court
will presume that the general allegations contain the specific facts
necessary to support the claim.53 This puts the plaintiff at an advantage at
the pleading stage.
While analyzing the “imminent harm” issue, the district court saw
the facts of this case as sitting somewhere between Zappos,54 where the
court held that the plaintiffs had sufficient risk of future harm to sue
defendants after alleging that hackers had stolen their personal
information from them, and Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,55 where the
Court held that the chance of the plaintiffs being incidentally surveilled
was not enough to challenge an act authorizing surveillance of foreign
persons.56 In League of Conservation Voters, the court used the following
evidence to find the complaint adequately alleged imminent harm: (1) the
stated purpose of the President’s Executive Order,57 (2) the oil industry’s
interest in drilling in the previously withdrawn regions,58 (3) the federal
government’s previous actions regarding oil and gas leases in the Arctic
and Atlantic Oceans under OCSLA,59 (4) the fact that seismic surveys
precede oil and gas lease sales,60 and (5) that seismic surveys harm
wildlife.61
The court found that this evidence created a short enough causal
chain to establish that the alleged harm from seismic surveying was
sufficiently imminent for Article III standing.62 In determining that the
evidence was closer to Zappos than Clapper, the court may have widened
the scope of what constitutes “imminent harm.”63 By likening the
somewhat uncertain risk of harm from companies surveying for gas and
oil when they do not yet have approval64 to the more concrete risk of harm
in Zappos, where wrongdoers actually had the plaintiff’s personal data in

53. 303 F. Supp. 3d. at 996 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (1992)).
54. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 884 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2018).
55. 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (holding that the plaintiff’s speculative chain of
possibilities did not establish an impending harm).
56. 303 F. Supp. 3d. at 997.
57. Id. at 997–98.
58. Id. at 998.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 999.
61. Id. at 998.
62. Id. at 999.
63. Id. at 997.
64. Id. at 998–99 (“[C]ompanies also have sought approval to conduct seismic
surveys even when lease sales are more than four years away and [are]
not included in an existing or proposed five-year program.”) (quoting Complaint
at 17–18, League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, No. 3:17CV00101 (D. Alaska
Mar. 3, 2017)).
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hand, the court moved the line for imminent harm further in favor of
future plaintiffs.
Next, the court found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient
“geographic specificity” even though the area of the alleged conduct was
128 million acres.65 While the area of concern is larger than that in
Kempthorne, the court noted that “it is discrete and defined.”66 If this case
proves an appropriate guide, future litigants should be very clear on the
regions in question to survive a motion to dismiss. Notably, this is not the
largest area of harm to survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment.
The plaintiffs in Juliana alleged global harm and survived.67 League of
Conservation Voters coupled with Juliana puts into question whether an
area can ever be too large for standing purposes as long as it is defined
with sufficient specificity.68
Finally, the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs
experienced personal and particularized harm to an interest in the
defined area rather than mere generalized harm to the environment.69
Particularized harm “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way.”70 Such harm can be towards mere aesthetic and recreational values
that are lessened by the challenged activity.71
Here, the plaintiffs alleged harm was to their “interest in visiting,
using, inhabiting, studying, and recreating in—or viewing wildlife that
depends on—areas affected by [the challenged activity].”72 This was
found to be sufficient to satisfy the requirement for “particularized
harm.”73 Of the three elements of injury in fact, the court’s interpretation
of this third element changes the least, as it was already broad enough to
include aesthetic or recreational interests.74 The court did not take into
account whether the afflicted area is actively in use, nor does the size of
the area seem to do any work for whether the injury is “personal.” If this
case stands, so long as environmental groups can show that they have
enjoyed the aesthetics of an area in the past, they should be able to show
particularized harm if it is affected by government action.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1000.
67. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1089–90 (D. Or. 2018).
68. See supra note 15 and accompanying discussion.
69. Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 707, (9th Cir.
2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 582 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
70. 303 F. Supp. 3d. at 1000 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1548 (2016)).
71. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63.
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V. CONCLUSION
League of Conservation Voters offers a potential roadmap for future
challenges to regulatory rollbacks, at least in their initial stages. The early
challenge for similar suits is to satisfy the elements of standing in order to
survive a motion to dismiss. League of Conservation Voters provides a
framework for overcoming that obstacle. Most notably, its understanding
of “imminent harm” allows for a longer causal chain and “geographic
specificity” imposes no limit on the size of an area in controversy, so long
as that area is discrete and defined. Though helpful, this ruling’s value is
limited for now, as the district court has yet to rule on the litigation’s
substantive issues. Nonetheless, this case represents a critical step for
groups hoping to enjoin deregulation of public lands. It will be
increasingly vital as groups such as Our Children’s Trust75 explore
avenues to establish standing in suits challenging the federal government
on climate change. Framing the issues in the same ways as the League of
Conservation Voters provides such similar organizations with more tools
to make sure they get their day in court.

75. In 2015, a group of children filed suit in U.S. District Court, and the suit
has moved throughout the courts in the pre-trial phase ever since, most recently
with the Ninth Circuit issuing a temporary stay on trial proceedings. Order at 3,
Juliana v. United States, No. 18-80176 (9th Cir. 2018), https://static1.square
space.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5c2432b140ec9a0be72fddc5/154
5876145804/DktEntry+8-1+Order+granting+appeal.pdf.

